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Judicial review of charitable trusts
Marcello Rodriguez Ferrere, the University of Otago
discusses the mixing of public and private law
T
he successful application for judicial review in Great
Christchurch Buildings Trust v Church Property Trust-
ees [2012] NZHC 3045 ought to give charitable
trusts some pause for thought.
THE FACTS
Christchurch Cathedral suffered significant damage in the
earthquakes that struck Canterbury in 2010 and 2011. In
October 2011, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Author-
ity (CERA) decided that the building was “dangerous” for
the purposes of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011
(the CERA Act). Accordingly, CERA gave notice to the
Church Property Trustees (CPT) who held the Cathedral in
trust, that the Cathedral was to be demolished to the extent
necessary to make it safe, and that CPT should indicate to
CERA whether it would prefer to undertake that work itself.
Following further earthquakes in December 2012 and
discussions with CERA and engineers, CPT was confronted
by a decision either to:
• Option 1: repair the Cathedral to ensure maximum
retention of the original structure;
• Option 2: deconstruct the Cathedral to “sill level”, two
or three metres above the ground; or
• Option 3: select an intermediate option, involving some
stabilisation and some deconstruction.
CERA favoured Option 2, and after discussions with various
groups, so too did CPT, which made its decision on 1 March
2012. The Great Christchurch Building Trust (BT) took issue
with the CPT decision. BT entered into correspondence with
CPT and eventually commissioned an independent engineer-
ing review panel to review the decision in June 2012. That
panel unanimously recommended Option 1, but engineers
engaged by CPT still preferred Option 2. In early August
2012, CPT confirmed its earlier decision.
BT filed proceedings against CPT on 15 August 2012. The
crux of its argument was that the central purpose of the trust
held by CPT was to maintain and repair the Cathedral. In
selecting Option 2 and its deconstruction, the decision defeated
that central purpose and was accordingly unlawful, both as a
breach of trust and a breach of statutory duty. CPT’s response
was that the main purpose of the trust was to use the
property as an ecclesiastical institution, not to maintain the
building in its exact form. In any case, CPT argued, CERA’s
notice imposed a mandatory legal obligation to deconstruct
the building and it was factually and legally impracticable for
CPT to commit to maximum retention.
Before Chisholm J determined the substantive proceed-
ings, he had to resolve challenges by CPT that BT lacked
standing to bring its application and its decision was not
amenable to judicial review. It is these two preliminary issues
that should catch the attention of charitable trusts, and what
this paper will focus upon.
STANDING
CPT argued that the trust it administered was a private
charitable trust, and since BT was neither a member nor
beneficiary of that trust, the Court should not afford it
standing to apply for review. To the extent that BT alleged a
breach of trust, CPT’s charitable trust status meant that the
Attorney-General should bring any proceedings under s 60
of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957. This was, prima facie, an
uncontroversial proposition. In Friends of Bishopscourt Inc
v Church Property Trustees HC Christchurch A 220/83,
14 October 1983 CPT had successfully challenged the stand-
ing of a plaintiff who sought declarations that CPT did not
have to sell “Bishopscourt” (the residence of the Christchurch
Bishop) which they also held in trust. Holland J struck out
the plaintiff’s application, on the basis that the plaintiff, an
incorporated society whose object was to support the Angli-
can Church in the maintenance of Bishopscourt, could not
possibly have an immediate personal interest in the subject
matter, since it was neither a beneficiary nor member of CPT,
and thus lacked standing to bring the proceedings.
The Court in the current proceedings, however, did not
accept that proposition and dismissed the CPT challenge to
BT’s standing. Without citing Bishopscourt, Chisholm J noted
a “liberalising trend” in judicial review jurisprudence that
meant that “the Court should be slow to close its door to
those genuinely seeking its assistance” (at [69] and [79]). The
public significance of the Cathedral and its future elevated
these proceedings to public interest litigation, and any reli-
ance upon the technicalities of CPT’s private charitable status
was inappropriate. Relying upon the decision in Finnigan
v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR
159 (CA), Chisholm J held that BT was equivalent to the
plaintiffs in that case, who were members of local rugby
clubs who sought to challenge the NZRFU over its decision
to tour apartheid South Africa, and were thus sufficiently
interested in the proceedings.
It is worth noting, however, that the plaintiffs in Finnigan
were linked to the NZRFU by a chain of contracts, and were
part of the structure of the whole organisation, distinguish-
ing them, as club members, “from mere followers of the
game or other members of the public” (Finnigan at 178).
Moreover, the issue in that case was of national importance:
judicial notice was taken that “in the view of a significant
number of people […] the decision affects the international
relations or standing of New Zealand” (Finnigan at 179).
Lastly, the Court of Appeal in Finnigan held that “[u]nless
persons such as the plaintiffs are accorded standing, it may
well be that in reality there is now no effective way of
establishing whether or not the Union is acting within its
lawful powers” (Finnigan at 179).
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Accordingly, whilst Finnigan doubtless represents liberalisa-
tion in the approach to standing, it was determined on
particular facts. The impetus that drove Finnigan was lack-
ing in the current proceedings. BT did not have the degree of
connection that the plaintiffs possessed in Finnigan, and it is
doubtful whether the maintenance of Christchurch Cathe-
dral is amatterofnational significance.Moreover, asChisholmJ
noted, s 60 of the Charitable Trusts Act meant that BT’s
proceedings were not the only way the Court could have
oversight over the decisions of CPT. Accordingly, the equiva-
lence of Finnigan is in doubt, especially given the contrary
precedent of Bishopscourt.
AMENABILITY TO REVIEW
CPT also argued that its decision was not amenable to
judicial review, and taking a similar approach as he did to the
issue of standing, Chisholm J dismissed the challenge. The
main argument by CPT was that it had not exercised a
“statutory power of decision” or affected BT’s “rights” as
defined and required by the Judicature Amendment Act 1972
(JAA) for a decision to be amenable to judicial review. In
response, both BT and Chisholm J favoured a more generous
approach to the amenability question.
Although CPT had acted in its capacity as trustee, BT
argued it was a statutory body acting under the Anglican
(Diocese of Christchurch) Church Property Trust Act 2003
(the 2003 Act). Although the 2003 Act did not establish CPT,
it does acknowledge its existence (s 5) and outlines its func-
tions (s 6) and powers (s 7). One of CPT’s statutory functions
is to “to hold and administer trust property in accordance
with this Act”, which includes the Cathedral. Accordingly,
BT argued that in making its decision, CPT met the first part
of the JAA’s definition of “statutory power of decision”
because it was exercising a power to make a decision con-
ferred upon it by the 2003 Act.
However, the second part of the JAA definition requires
that decision to “affect the rights” of any person. It is
Chisholm J’s analysis of this second part that piques interest.
Accepting Elias J’s (as she then was) broad approach to the
definition of “rights” in CMP v Director General of Social
Welfare (1996) 15 FRNZ 40 (HC), Chisholm J held (at [92]):
Once the true public nature of the Cathedral trust is taken
into account I am satisfied that the decision affects the
“rights” of those members of the community, including
the trustees of the BT, who wish, for whatever reason, to
enjoy the Cathedral.
Just as Chisholm J’s reliance upon Finnigan was question-
able, so too was his reliance upon CMP. In that decision,
Elias J was satisfied that the decision at issue was “one
affecting CMP’s fundamental human rights recognised by
law” (at 37). Chisholm J was accurate in describing Elias J’s
interpretation as broadening the definition of “rights”, but it
still required those rights to be recognised by law, such as
those contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
Whilst no-one can deny that the community enjoyed the
Cathedral, and that BT has a genuine interest in its preserva-
tion, it is a significant leap for that interest to develop into a
right to enjoy the Cathedral. Although it was not discussed, it
is difficult to comprehend what human rights or other rights
recognised by law were affected by the CPT decision, and
thus Chisholm J’s classification of such interests as rights,
without any further legal analysis or precedent cited, is
problematic.
Of course, the JAA is not the only route to judicial review,
even if it is the most preferred. Generally, any exercise of
power that has public consequences is potentially amenable
to judicial review, and the more important the power (or the
consequences of its exercise) the higher the susceptibility:
(Taylor, GDS Judicial Review in New Zealand (Wellington:
LexisNexis, 2010) at 25). The key determinant for amena-
bility is the nature of the power, and not the source: R v Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB
815 at 847.
However, as Taylor notes, “public consequences” amounts
to “the practical power to determine or affect the rights,
broadly defined, of persons that have not consented to that”
(at 25). This means that even if the Court looked to the
common law for jurisdiction rather than the JAA, it may still
have been confronted by the conundrum of whether BT and
thecommunityhadalegalright to“enjoymentof theChristchurch
Cathedral”. Accordingly, it might have been inescapable
genuinely to question whether BT’s interest in the preserva-
tion of the Cathedral was sufficient to justify the Court’s
supervision over a statutory, but essentially private body. In
any case, a proper discussion on the topic would have been
preferable to the absence of any detailed analysis.
THE COURT’S CONCLUSION
Having decided that the Court had jurisdiction to examine
the CPT decision, Chisholm J measured its legality purely
against the terms of the trust it administered (at [145]–[146]):
CPT hold the Cathedral property for the purposes of the
trust created in 1858. As I have already concluded, those
purposes involve, first, the erection of a Cathedral on the
site and, secondly, the continued existence of a Cathedral
on the site indefinitely thereafter.
What happens in the situation that has arisen where the
Cathedral has been severely damaged? The answer is that
unless the terms of the Cathedral trust are varied, either
the structure that remains will have to be repaired or it
will have to be replaced by another Cathedral. In the
absence of one of those steps the whole purpose of the
trust would be defeated.
Thus, the criteria that Chisholm J used to measure the
legality of CPT’s decision-making was whether it defeated
the purpose of the trust. As he noted (at [162]):
… it is a fundamental tenet of trust law that trustees must
administer the trust property in accordance with the pur-
poses of the trust. The purpose of the Cathedral trust is to
have a Cathedral on the site. Standing alone a decision to
deconstruct the Cathedral would defeat the central pur-
pose of the trust.
On this measure, by selecting Option 2 (deconstruction of
the Cathedral), the CPT decision prima facie defeated the
central purpose of the trust. But for counsel indicating from
the bar CPT’s intention to rebuild the Cathedral, Chisholm J
would have accordingly declared the decision illegal (at
[163]). Instead, Chisholm J declared the decision “incom-
plete”; presumably indicating that the decision was a poten-
tial, but not yet realised, breach of trust.
On this basis, the Court decided to intervene, staying the
CPT decision, directing CPT to reconsider its decision and,
finally, making a formal declaration that “while the Cathe-
dral trust requires there to be a Cathedral on the Cathedral
Square site, the building does not necessarily have to repli-
cate the Cathedral as it stood before the earthquakes” (at
[184]).
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A significant portion of Chisholm J’s decision was dedicated
to determining whether the Court had a public law jurisdic-
tion to examine the CPT decision. It is thus curious that
having decided that it had such a jurisdiction, the Court used
orthodox trust principles — private law — to determine the
proceedings.
In this regard, it is clear why Chisholm J saw an analogue
between the case and that of Finnigan, where the plaintiffs
argued that the NZRFU’s decision was contrary to its object
of “controlling, promoting, fostering and developing the
gameofamateurRugbyUnionFootballthroughoutNewZealand”
as stated in its rules. Judicial review in that case was used to
hold a private organisation to its private law obligations, just
as CPT was held to its obligations as trustee. The justification
for using a public law mechanism to enforce private law
obligations in Finnigan was because the case fell “…into a
special area where, in the New Zealand context, a sharp
boundary between public and private law cannot realistically
be drawn” (at 179). The question is whether the current case
legitimately fell within a similar twilight zone, or, perhaps
more importantly, whether the justification used in Finnigan
is legitimate at all.
CMP, the decision which Chisholm J relied upon to show
that the CPT decision was a statutory power of decision, did
not fall into this twilight zone. Elias J held that the decision
had miscarried on the basis of an agency misinterpreting its
statutory powers and taking into account irrelevant consid-
erations (at 43–44). These are classic grounds of judicial
review that are absent from the current proceedings. While
the distinction between a misinterpretation of a statute and
breach of trust may appear semantic — both after all, are
unlawful and can involve similar errors — judicial review
only has a place in correcting the former; the latter is cor-
rected by the normal tenets of trust law.
A decision only becomes amenable to judicial review if it
has a “public law element” (Taylor, at 26). We must be wary
when the same measure used to determine this amenability
question is not used when actually examining the decision:
quite simply, if jurisdiction requires a public law element, so
too should the resolution of the proceedings; it should not be
decided on private law grounds. Otherwise, we risk the
situation which has arisen here: BT, who has no private law
standing to challenge CPT, using public law as a back door to
gain standing and then proceed to challenge CPT on private
law grounds. Experts in both trust and administrative law
ought to be worried over this inelegant marriage of their
disciplines.
A WORRYING PRECEDENT?
What, if anything, does this mean for other charitable trusts?
If CPT stands for the precedent that sufficient public interest
in a private decision has the alchemic ability to give that
decision a public law element, then the answer is “plenty”.
Existing precedent, as noted above, did not provide scope
for strangers to a charitable trust to directly challenge trust-
ees. Yet as stated in Napier City Council v Residual Health
Management Ltd HC Napier CIV-2004-441-35, 30 March
2004, even beneficiaries do not have standing to sue for
breach of charitable trusts: “the appropriate remedy is for
the Attorney-General to sue if at any point the terms of the
trust are breached” (at [21]). This conclusion was based on
the precedent of Titchener v Attorney-General (1990) 3 PRNZ
52 (which itself relied upon the Bishopscourt case) and
Kaikoura County v Boyd [1949] NZLR 233 (CA), all of
which stand for the precedent that it “seems generally desir-
able that the Attorney-General should be a party at least to
any action concerning a charitable trust of substantial value
for the benefit of the general public” (Kaikoura County
at 262).
As noted, this argument was brought before the Court by
CPT, to which Chisholm J responded that “while in the usual
course of events the Attorney-General might have a particu-
lar role in relation to charitable trusts, events in Canterbury
over recent times have been far from usual” (at [79]).
However admirable, this statement has undertones of the
observation made by Oliver Wendell Holmes in Northern
Securities Co v United States (1904) 193 US 197 (at 400–401):
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases
are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some acci-
dent of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals
to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Only the Attorney-General has standing to challenge the
decisions of trustees of a charitable trust. By giving BT
standing — through the back door, using public law prin-
ciples — the Court’s judgment ran against many decades of
settled precedent, for seemingly no principled reason beyond
the occurrence of the Canterbury earthquakes. It might be
that this case is confined to its facts and the “unusual”
circumstances caused by the earthquakes may prevent this
decision acting as precedent for future cases. Moreover,
unlike the CPT, the vast majority of charitable trusts are not
creatures of statute, and this is one way of potentially distin-
guishing the case.
However, the statutory nature of the CPT was only rel-
evant to having its decision being amenable to judicial review.
It was simply the public interest in the decision that afforded
BT standing to bring the proceedings in the first instance.
Accordingly, as many iconic New Zealand buildings are held
by charitable trusts, future challenges by community groups
against decisions affecting those buildings is not an outland-
ish prospect. Where hitherto those community groups would
need to seek the assistance of the Attorney-General to enable
such a challenge, they may now try and circumvent that
requirement by applying instead for judicial review.
Such proceedings would place a court in an unenviable
position. If it followed the orthodox approach and denied the
applicants standing, it would essentially amount to holding
that the public interest in the building at issue was of lesser
importance than that in the Christchurch Cathedral. If it
granted the applicants standing by affirming the approach of
Chisholm J, it would cement an extremely liberal approach
to standing and put all charitable trusts at risk of the type of
proceedings that the Charitable Trusts Act expressly insu-
lates them from by requiring the Attorney-General’s involve-
ment in any challenge.
The apparent dichotomy of allowing standing or denying
justice was a false one, for the normal course of requiring the
Attorney-General to intervene would have provided over-
sight of the CPT decision. Instead, in holding that sufficient
public interest will justify the circumvention of normal legal
requirements, the Court has at best, created a lacuna and at
worst, put all charitable trusts at risk. r
New Zealand Law Journal April 2013 109
[2013] NZLJ 107
